First Junket Report: CCO 2nd Annual Conference

A couple members of the Pie Cabinet traveled to Washington, DC for the Center for Complex Operations 2nd annual conference. It was quite an event, and if anyone from that organization reads this, I'd like to have you over for pie.

There was lots of interesting material, consisting of singleton speakers and panel discussions, on the "3D's", Defense, Diplomacy and Development. I remember getting into aerospace engineering when the "3d's" meant dull, dirty and dangerous, the kind of work that should be handed off to unmanned systems. Had I any doubt that the passion for a Revolution in Military Affairs was dead, it's been settled.

Two broad themes seemed to emerge from all of the discussions: (1) the importance of adaptability and (2) the growing militarizarion of foreign policy.

These are not fundamentally opposed, actually they're quite complementary in our system. Militaries throughout history have been major sources of innovation, since the concept of "maneuver" applies to technology and doctrine just as much as the movement of engaged units. Today, the US DoD runs five undergraduate institutions (USMA, USNA, USAFA, USCGA, USMMA), four War Colleges (USN, USMC, USAF, US Army), and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with satellite campuses nearly everywhere (this may not be a complete list). Not to mention the hundreds of rigorous academic courses taught by officers around the country in ROTC programs, and schools for everything an enlistee might have to do. Slightly outside the DoD are "Centers of Excellence" such as the Center for Naval Analysis and RAND corporation whose exact job is to keep smart people on call to solve tough problems. Also, and it was argued more importantly, all but its very tip-top is run by career professionals who are largely promoted on merit, regardless of administration. Obama got lots of kudos for keeping Gates, and the relative smoothness of DoD's actions vs. State, Treasury and other departments' speaks to the problems that come with the Spoils System (thanks President Jackson!).

On the civilian side, we have the US State Department and USAID. The performance of State tends to improve as an administration goes on, but every four or eight years its top people, and I think it's the same number of people as DoD despite having only ~10K people at Foggy Bottom, you get a fresh bunch of leaders who probably don't like the policies of their predecessors. The result has been a more ossified legalistic culture below the appointee ranks, since promotion depends not on ability and initiative but conforming to established rules. The middle and upper level management of State is run by former FSOs who've had to deal with this their whole professional lives, making it very difficult for them to culturally adapt to a changing world. On the other hand, Provincial Resconstruction Teams (PRTs) made up of enthusiastic youngsters with a clear mandate to do what is necessary to accomplish their "hearts and minds" mission are credited with a lot the success in parts of Afghanistan and Iraq. The resemblance to Roman military engineering teams shouldn't be overlooked.

As a result, USAID is trying to formalize this quasimilitary approach to development assistance. Specifically, several speakers spoke of a more "expeditionary" USAID; one that would relate to its grantee NGOs and in-country employees as a theater commander setting goals for deployed companies and batallions. Details of this arrangement, which scares the crap out of the NGO community, have not been finalized yet.

To the extend that US policy is designed to improve the capacity of states to exert their writ and for their people to become prosperous, this militarization is appropriate, according to several panelists. The chief obstacle to development in much of the world, especially the places where the US is deploying more aid, is security. Development projects have a mixed record at best, but they always fail when security fails. Whomever is officially in charge of the project needs to acknowledge that, and adopting cultural aspects from the most dynamic of government departments (scary, isn't it) can only help break a beaucratic logjam. Militarized need not mean jack-booted, but must include a fundamental recognition that "the enemy gets a vote, too." --paraphrased from a general during the COIN debate in 2005ish

Unfortunately, formally implementing these lessons will require action from Congress and an end to much of the Spoils System. On top of that, a paradigm shift is needed in the thinking about development aid and perhaps even the definition of prosperity, governance and security. Knowing that lots of smart people have decided to find solutions makes me hopeful that they'll succeed. But Mark Twain's commentary on the denziens of the Hill is as true as ever.